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These two papers concern the existence of Cournot-Nash equilibrium for games, the
characteristics of which may be summarized as follows: (1) the space of players is
represented by a measure space (T,Σ, µ), where, as usual, T is interpreted as the set of
players, Σ as the collection of permissible coalitions and µ(A) as the size of the coalition
A ∈ Σ; (2) strategies are described by a set-valued map X from T to a separable Banach
space E over the reals—X(t) is then the strategy set of player t ∈ T ; (3) the players’
payoffs are generated by nonordered preferences (i.e., relations that may fail to be either
transitive or complete); furthermore, let S′X be the set of Bochner-integrable selections
x:T → E of X and let P(E) be the set of nonempty subsets of E: payoff functions are
formalized by a set-valued preference map P from T ×S′X to P(E) where P (t, x) is the
set of strategies player t prefers to x(t), and it is thus naturally assumed that x(t) /∈
P (t, x); (4) finally, feasibility is introduced by means of a constraint correspondence
A from T × S′X to the set Pwfc(E) of closed (with respect to the weak topology) and
convex subsets of E, satisfying the condition that for all (t, x) ∈ T ×S′X , A(t, x)⊆X(t).
The main results of the first paper are extensions of previous existence theorems
for games with a measure space of players to games with nonordered preferences and
infinite-dimensional strategy sets [see, e.g., Khan and R. Vohra, J. Math. Econom. 13
(1984), no. 2, 133–142; MR0758569; D. Schmeidler, J. Statist. Phys. 7 (1973), 295–300;
MR0465225]. These results require that the set T be endowed with a topological struc-
ture (indeed T is assumed to be a locally compact metric space) and also assumptions
regarding the Hausdorff continuity of P on S′X , and the satisfaction of an interiority
and a convexity condition by the maps A and P , respectively; all these assumptions are
then dispensed with in the second reviewed paper. Also, a sophisticated Carathe´odory
type of selection theorem which is proved and used in the first paper becomes unneces-
sary in the framework of the second one. Erwin Klein
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